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Neurodiversity in Public Schools:
A Critique of Special Education in America
by PALLAVI M. VISHWANATH*

Introduction
“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.”1 If equal educational opportunity were a constitutional
right, then all students could have the opportunity to maximize their
potential. Alternatively, the lack of cultural, political, and legal recognition
of intelligence pluralism results in lost human potential and societal
contribution.2 When a society only considers specific ways of learning to be
“typical,” it implies that limited ways of cognitive performance, reasoning,
socialization, perception of stimuli, and emotional processing give people
competitive benefits in education and the marketplace.3 Neurodiverse
expressions of intelligence and cognition are consequently “atypical,”
stigmatized, and labeled as disabilities. Individuals with disabilities, or
neurodiverse abilities, are often excluded from social and civil citizenship
because they do not have equal opportunity to maximize their potential.4 As
a result, societies are harmed because there is great loss in human potential.5
Atypical brain structure and functioning are quantitatively and
qualitatively relevant to a variety of systems, which not only affects
individuals but also democracy as a whole.6 Millions of adolescents
diagnosed with a wide range of neurodiverse conditions ranging from
neurodevelopmental disorders to learning disabilities will transition into
* University of California, Hastings, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020; Master in the Study of Law,
University of California, Hastings 2016; Bachelor of Arts, Saint Louis University 2014. The author
would like to thank Andrea Lollini for his helpful comments and advice for this Note. This Note
is dedicated to Derrick High and the Valley Children’s Hospital.
1. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public
Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 64 (2011).
3. Andrea Lollini, Brain Equality: Legal Implications of Neurodiversity in a Comparative
Perspective, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 69, 132.
4. Id.
5. Imoukhuede, supra note 2.
6. Lollini, supra note 3, at 83.
[595]
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adulthood over the next decade, which significantly impacts healthcare and
social security systems.7 People with learning disabilities typically struggle
with underemployment and face additional exposure to the criminal justice
system because of the lack of equal education.8
Accordingly,
misunderstanding and excluding neurodiverse individuals is detrimental to
societies on multiple levels.
Public education is the means for governments to ensure that all people
enter the marketplace with foundational tools to effectively compete in
society despite unequal advantages and intergenerational factors outside an
individual’s control.9 Inequality in education services often excludes
individuals with neurodiverse traits from social and civil citizenship. For
instance, a majority of incarcerated youth in America have learning and
emptional disabilities.10 Analyzing special education in public schools
reveals how a society values the potential of and contribution from
individuals with neurodiverse traits or disabled students.
Although the United States statutorily establishes public education for
all students, education is not considered a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution. Instead, education seems to be treated as a service rather
than a right. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, students must only be provided with access to public education
services. This standard leaves the American government with an ambiguous
duty to provide students with services that subjectively benefit individual
students differently. Further, this standard allows separate, unequal, and
different educational opportunities for students with disabilities.11 Although
the United States has passed federal, state, and local laws in attempts to
protect students from discrimination, these laws are not synonymous with
developing every students’ potential. This is because racial or gender
discrimination receive stricter levels of review than disability discrimination.
As a result, “equal” education for disabled students drastically varies by
region, time period, and forum.12
Canada, on the other hand, recognizes education as a constitutional right
and renounces the “separate but equal” inquiry for disabled students.13 This
is because Canada finds a governmental duty to meaningfully maximize
7. Lollini, supra note 3, at 82.
8. Candace Cortiella & Sheldon H. Horowitz, The State of Learning Disabilities: Facts,
Trends and Emerging Issues, NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES (2014).
9. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 48.
10. Nat’l Council on Disability, Breaking the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Students with
Disabilities, June 18, 2015, at 6.
11. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
199 (1982).
12. Perry A. Zirkel, The autism case law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 17 FOCUS ON
AUTISM AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 91(2002).
13. Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (Can.).
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every student’s potential regardless of disability.14
Canada also
acknowledges that wasted human potential harms both individual students
and society at large. The contrasting governmental commitments to provide
equal education in America and Canada demonstrate opposite duties to
maximize students’ potentials.
This Note reasons that a country or democracy is most benefitted when
there is a recognized governmental duty to maximize the potential of every
student via public education. Further, it exposes how a difference in
governmental duty to provide equal education drastically affects students’
dignity and potential. Part I describes the history of the American public
education system. Part II explains the development of special education in
the United States and the ambiguous governmental duty to educate American
students. Part III discusses Canadian case law regarding special education
to show that providing access to equal educational opportunities promotes a
healthy democracy. Ultimately, this Note argues that in defining education
as a right, rather than a service, America can better establish equality in
public education and foster the human potential of all students to become
productive members of society.

I.

Public Education in America: Unequal Opportunities

The right to education is not a fundamental right under the United States
Constitution, but Congress has passed statutes with the goal of creating a
governmental duty to provide students with an education.15 American courts
seem to interpret these vague statutes to find that education services are
provided successfully unless there is an obvious due process violation.
Although Congress amended education acts with the intent to be more
inclusive of students with disabilities, there are great discrepancies in courts’
interpretations of equal access to public education and assessments of the
appropriate levels of inclusion.16 These discrepancies are better understood
by analyzing students’ access to public education generally before
examining the rippling consequences on students with disabilities.
The United States Supreme Court held that education is not a
fundamental right in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.17 Parents of poor, minority students attending schools financed
by a low property tax base brought a class action against the school district
in the District Court for the Western District of Texas.18 Plaintiffs argued

14.
15.
16.

Id.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179.
Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (2007).
17. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
18. Id. at 4–5.
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that education is an implied right because education is essential to effectively
exercise First Amendment rights and intelligently utilize the right to vote.19
They further alleged that disparity in public education funding and quality of
education among school districts violated their guaranteed equal rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The District
Court found the financing scheme unconstitutional because the court
recognized education as a fundamental right; however, the Supreme Court
struck down the lower court’s approach.21 The Supreme Court explained
that education is not within the limited category of constitutionally protected
rights, and even if it was, the Texas education system did not fail to provide
the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose.22 Further, the Court
found that plaintiffs’ equal protection rights were not violated because the
tax scheme assured a basic education for every child in the state.23
In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court maintained that separate
learning institutions for students based on sex and opportunities are
constitutional so long as there is “substantial” equality.24 In that case, the
Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) was the only higher public education
institution in Virginia for military leadership.25
VMI utilized an
“adversative” method to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets
and had a male-only admissions policy.26 The United States sued the
Commonwealth of Virginia alleging an equal protection violation for
maintaining a college exclusively for males.27 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled for the Commonwealth, but
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and tasked Virginia with
creating a remedial plan.28 Virginia created a parallel program for women
that did not use the adversarial method, but instead used a less-rigorous,
nonmilitary, cooperative training program to account for perceived
differences in learning styles between men and women.29 This program
lacked funding, prestige, and the graduates would “not have the advantage
afforded by a VMI degree.”30
The parallel program for women was built on generic and outdated
assumptions about the sexes, which resulted in inferior educational methods
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 49.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 554 (1996).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 523.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525.
Id. at 527.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 527.
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and lack of prestige. The Supreme Court found that this bifurcated approach
resulted in an unacceptable and unconstitutional disparity.31 Chief Justice
William Rehnquist clarified in his Concurring Opinion that the Court’s
rationale supported separate but equal institutions separated on the basis of
sex if the same quality of education were offered at each institution.32 The
Court, therefore, ruled that separation in education is inherently unequal
when a protected class such as race is concerned, but this is not necessarily
true when a quasi-protected class such as gender is concerned.33 This narrow
holding, therefore, did not find that separation in education was unequal and
unconstitutional in all applications, but only in limited situations.
Unlike the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia,34
the Supreme Court of the United States failed to reject a “separate but equal”
inquiry.35 The Supreme Court of the United States only considered the
exclusion of women unconstitutional because there was no “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for their exclusion.36 The decisions in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez and United States v. Virginia
reveal how America justifies unequal educational opportunities: education is
not a right and separate is not inherently unequal. As a result, American
public schools institutionally isolate vulnerable students who have atypical
cognitive performance or learning styles.37
The American approach lacks an understanding of neurodiversity or
cognitive pluralism because it labels students as typical and atypical learners.
Labeling atypical students as “disabled” substantially limits their ability to
reach their maximum potential because of the disparity in the quality and
adequacy of the public education they receive.38 Despite America’s progress
in passing federal legislation to establish equal public education, disparity
endures. Because the Supreme Court of the United States does not inherently
reject a “separate but equal” justification and does not consider education a
fundamental right, special education is a secondary service within American
public education.

31. Id. at 553–54.
32. Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, W., concurring) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 533–34.
34. See infra pp. 18-20.
35. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, W., concurring) (“. . . it is not the exclusion of
women that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but the maintenance of an all-men school without
providing any—much less a comparable—institution for women”).
36. Id. at 524.
37. Hensel, supra note 16, at 1147–48.
38. Id.
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II. Special Education in America:
The Refusal to Maximize Potential
Before Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (“EAHCA”), there were more than eight million children with
disabilities, most of whom were excluded from any sort of educational
opportunity.39 In the early 1970s, the decisions in Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania40 and
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia41 recognized the
exclusion of disabled students from public education as a violation of due
process rights and equal protection under the law. In 1975, Congress passed
the EAHCA to require that public schools accepting federal funds provide
equal access to education.42 In 1990, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA and
renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).43 The
United States Supreme Court first addressed the government’s duty to
provide equal education to students with disabilities in Board of Education
of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley.44 Later, the
Supreme Court clarified the governmental duty to provide a free and
appropriate education to disabled students in Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District Re-1.45
A. EAHCA: Establishing Public Education for Disabled Students

In 1971, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that no child shall be denied access to free public education based on their
disability.46 In PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,47 plaintiffs,
parents of thirteen intellectually disabled students deemed to be uneducable,
argued that Pennsylvania violated their equal protection rights by refusing to
provide them with a free public education.48 This case ultimately affirmed
that equality in education requires the government to place each disabled
child in a free public program of education and training appropriate to the
child’s capacity because all disabled students “are capable of benefiting from
a program of education and training.”49 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
39. Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 1 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
189 (2006).
40. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1971)
(hereinafter “PARC”).
41. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
42. Hensel, supra note 16, at 1148.
43. Id. at 1156.
44. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
45. Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 991 (2017).
46. PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1265.
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was the first court to recognize that students with disabilities are entitled to
a public school education.50
Months later, in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the District
of Columbia must provide children of school age with a free and suitable
publicly-supported education, regardless of the child’s mental, physical, or
emotional disability or impairment.51 The Court also held that lack of
funding is not a justifiable reason to exclude a child from public education.52
In Mills, seven students with disabilities were denied education because they
were classified as having behavioral issues.53 The District Court for the
District of Columbia held that denying plaintiffs and their class publicly
supported education and excluding them from schooling without review
violated the due process of law.54 The court reasoned that excluding children
with disabilities from the public school system also denied them equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is a component of the
due process that binds the District under the Fifth Amendment.55 The court
cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education to reason
that: “[c]ompulsory school attendance laws . . . demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. . . . Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made on equal terms.56
Similar to its analysis in United States v. Virginia, the Court did not
reject the notion of a “separate but equal” approach.57 It did, however,
find that the Board of Education shall not exclude any child from a regular
public school unless the child is provided adequate alternative
educational services suited to the child’s needs, and a constitutionally
adequate prior review of the child’s “status, progress, and the adequacy
of any educational alternative.”58
Neither PARC nor Mills clarified what equal education looked like for a
neurodiverse student population.
Neither court went further than
acknowledging that disabled children’s due process and equal protection
rights were violated when they had no access to public schools. Although
both PARC and Mills held that disabled children must have access to
adequate and publicly supported education, neither required a specific

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Gordon, supra note 39, at 193.
Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 876.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525.
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
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standard level of education.59 Congress attempted to address this ambiguity
by passing the EAHCA in 1975 which guaranteed access to public schools,
support, and necessary services to achieve a “free[,] appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”) to all children.60
B. Developing FAPE in EAHCA and IDEA

In 1990, the United States Congress reauthorized and renamed
EAHCA61 to IDEA.62 Like EAHCA, IDEA offered federal funding to assist
States in educating children with disabilities. Still, IDEA provides no
substantive guidance regarding the level of education for students with
disabilities.63 Congress’ intent can, therefore, be better understood from
examining IDEA’s development.
In 1997, significantly new amendments to IDEA were passed. First,
state and local education agencies (“LEAs”), such as a public board of
education, were to assess and ensure the effectiveness of efforts to educate
children with disabilities. Second, IDEA emphasized access to the general
curriculum in an attempt to guarantee full inclusion with general education
students. Third, discipline standards and procedures incorporated the use of
behavioral assessments and behavioral intervention plans. Fourth, a
provision was added in favor of the use of positive behavioral interventions
and supports for children with disabilities that impeded their learning or the
learning of others. Finally, parents’ role in the decision-making process was
significantly strengthened.64 These changes were prompted by Congress’
fear of the growing population of students receiving special education
services due to the expanding eligibility standard under IDEA. This made
Congress fear that the Act was no longer serving the “truly disabled” as
Congress intended.65
Congress, therefore, amended the definition of children “with a
disability” by giving states the discretion to include children between the
ages of three and nine experiencing “developmental delays” in the coverage
of the statute.66 Young children may not exactly fit within categories of
disabilities identified in IDEA and this possibly avoided problems associated
with early mislabeling. Congress urged the United States Department of
Education and state agencies to carefully consider in every evaluation: the
59. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
60. Gordon, supra note 39, at 194; EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
61. EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
62. IDEA, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (1990).
63. Gordon, supra note 39, at 195.
64. H. Rutherford Turnbull III, Brennan L. Wilcox & Matthew J. Stowe, A Brief Overview
of Special Education Law with Focus on Autism, 32 J. OF AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
479 (2002).
65. Hensel, supra note 16, at 1150.
66. Id. at 1151.
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high rate of misdiagnoses based on race, mislabeling children who simply
had not previously received proper academic support, and children with
limited English proficiency.67
IDEA was amended again in 2004 with eligibility concerns at the
forefront.68 The amended statute required states to maintain policies and
procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate overload, or
disproportional representation by race and ethnicity of children as related to
labeling a child as disabled. The Act permitted LEAs to use up to 15% of
federal funding to create “early intervening services” for students who were
not identified as needing special education or related services, but who need
additional academic and behavioral support to succeed in a general education
environment.69 Congress hoped this would help distinguish children with
different learning styles from children with disabilities, reduce special
education referrals, and benefit the general classroom environment by
reducing academic and behavioral problems.70 These amendments reflect a
move towards recognizing neurodiversity by arming public schools with
pluralistic resources. This approach, however, is still based on treating
students as typical or atypical learners with rights to consequently different
qualities of education.
The list of protected impairments under IDEA includes the following
categories of disabilities: mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or
language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance,
autism, orthopedic impairments, traumatic brain injury, specific learning
disabilities, and other health impairments.71 IDEA conditions federal
funding on state compliance with the statute, particularly that every eligible
child receives a FAPE by means of a uniquely tailored “individualized
education program” (“IEP”).72 The IEP is a comprehensive plan created by
a students’ “IEP team” of teachers, school officials, advocates and the
student’s parents or guardians that tailors the student’s education based on a
child’s individual circumstances.
If there is a disagreement between the students’ parents or guardians and
school officials, IDEA provides informal mediation. If the mediation does
not resolve the disagreement, there is a due process hearing before the state
or LEA. The losing party may seek redress in state or federal court.73
Although IDEA implements many ways to provide disabled students with
equal education, the amendments seem to focus on what is appropriate
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Hensel, supra note 16, at 1157.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 108-77 at 104 (2003).
Hensel, supra note 16, at 1163.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182.
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more than what is substantively equal. The Supreme Court of the United
States’ decisions in the Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson
Central School District v. Rowley74 and Endrew F. v Douglas County
School District75 exemplify the type of education that the American
government finds a duty to provide.
In Rowley, the Supreme Court found that providing a specialized
education to disabled children generated “. . . no additional requirement that
the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.”76 Plaintiff
Amy Rowley successfully completed kindergarten in a regular classroom
because her IEP included the use of a hearing aid. Plaintiff’s parents wanted
a sign language interpreter in all her academic classes along with the other
services proposed in her IEP. The interpreter, school administrators, the
district’s Committee on the Handicapped, and the New York Commissioner
of Education denied the request because Rowley was “achieving
educationally, academically, and socially without such assistance.”77 The
Rowleys claimed that the administrator’s denial of the sign language
interpreter constituted a denial of FAPE in the United District Court for the
Southern District of New York.78
The District Court assumed it possessed the responsibility to give
content to the requirement of an “appropriate education.” The court held that
FAPE required that the potential of the disabled student be measured to her
performance and that resulting differential be compared to the shortfall
experienced by nondisabled students.79 Although Rowley performed better
than the average child in her class and was advancing from grade to grade,
the court found that her education under FAPE was causing a disparity in her
true potential.80 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.81
Although the Court agreed that Congress failed to substantively define
an appropriate level of education for disabled students, it found an express
definition for a “free appropriate public education.” A FAPE includes
special education and related services: a) provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge; b) meeting the
standards of the State educational agency; c) including an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved;
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 203.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 203.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 210.
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and d) provided in conformity with the IEP.82 The Court concluded there
was no duty to maximize students’ potential; rather, “if personalized
instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the
child to benefit from the instruction . . . the child is receiving a ‘free
appropriate education’” and thus satisfied the statute.83
In Rowley, the Dissent argued that providing some educational benefit
was not enough to meet the unique needs of disabled children.84 Rowley
understood less than half of what was said in the classroom and her
opportunity to education was unarguably unequal to her fellow
classmates.85 However, the Court reasoned that, when the EAHCA passed,
Congress only intended to make public education available to disabled
children who were previously excluded from the system.86 Against this
backdrop, the Court read the statute to simply require states to provide
meaningful access to education, which was satisfied if they provide a
“basic floor of opportunity” to disabled students.87 The Rowley Court held
that the school satisfied its obligation by providing Rowley with services
that provided enough educational benefits to allow her to perform above
average in a general classroom.88
The Majority relied on PARC and Mills to explain that States had no
imposed obligation beyond the requirement that handicapped children
receive some form of specialized education services.89 The Court looked at
Senate reports and legislative history to decide that disabled children receive
an “appropriate education” when personalized educational services are
provided, but the Court did “not think that such statements imply a
congressional intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services.”90
Therefore, the goal was not to provide each disabled child with an equal
educational opportunity because “. . . public school systems undoubtedly
differ from student to student . . . . The requirement that States provide
“equal” opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable
standard . . . .”91 The Justices declined to establish a single test to determine
if the level of education provided to disabled students was adequate under
the law.92 As a result, after Rowley, federal courts developed their own twist

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189.
Id.
Id. at 192 (White, B., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
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on the substantive requirement under FAPE without maximizing disabled
students’ potential to learn.
Some courts, like the Tenth Circuit, bent the Court’s finding in Rowley
to mean that states satisfied their duty to provide equal education to disabled
students when students barely made some, or de minimis, progress.93 In
Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1,94 the Supreme Court
clarified that FAPE required more than de minimis progress. The Court
found that schools must provide students with an education “reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child’s circumstances.”95 Plaintiff (“Endrew”) attended public school from
preschool through fourth grade, when his academic and functional progress
stalled.96 Endrew’s parents felt that he was not making meaningful
progress due to the lack of advancement in the goals and objectives in his
IEP. They further contended that many objectives in Endrew’s IEP were
discontinued or abandoned because he did not make adequate progress and
the school district failed to adequately address his increased inability to
access the educational environment. Because the school district failed to
conduct a functional behavioral assessment, implement appropriate
positive behavioral support, or develop an appropriate behavioral
improvement plan, Endrew enrolled in a private school specializing in the
education of children with autism.97
Endrew’s parents claimed that the school district failed provide an IEP
that was reasonably calculated to provide Endrew with FAPE and sought
reimbursement for the private school tuition and transportation costs. The
school district refused. The administrative law judge ruled in favor of the
school district, concluding that the proposed IEP was reasonably calculated
to enable Endrew to receive educational benefits and, therefore, the IEP was
not a denial of FAPE.98 The District Court of Colorado affirmed because
Endrew made some minimal progress and “[i]n the court’s view, that was all
Rowley demanded.”99 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
finding that Rowley stated that an IEP is adequate if it calculated to confer
an educational benefit that is merely more than de minimis.100 The Supreme
Court rejected the de minimis standard, but still held that Rowley imposed no

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991 (emphasis added).
Id. at 996.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997.
Id.
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explicit substantive standard, nor did it guarantee any level of education or
potential outcome.101
Again, the Court did not establish a duty to maximize the potential of
students through education, disabled or not. The American approach to
equality in education only creates a minimal duty to ensure that disabled
students are not excluded from access to basic public education and that their
IEP is reasonably calculated to enable a student to make appropriate
progress, not maximum progress. The Court rejected Endrew’s parent’s
argument that FAPE should provide disabled children “. . . opportunities to
achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society
that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without
disabilities.”102 Instead, IDEA simply requires an educational program
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances.103
Justice Roberts noted the factual differences between the plaintiffs in
both Rowley and Endrew to show that what may be educationally appropriate
for one studentm may not be appropriate for another, therefore, assessment
should be child focused and not criterion or normative based.104 America,
therefore, legally permits institutional isolation and educational disparity
because equal education is not a right enjoyed by all students. This shows
that separate and unequal educational services are not unconstitutional by
default. Canada’s approach to equal education starkly differs because it
rejects categorizing students in a typical versus atypical label within
neurodiversity. Canada instead compares disabled students’ access and
progress to all children receiving education generally to ensure substantively
equal education.

III. Education in Canada
Canada recognizes education as a right and takes a substantive approach
to equality by recognizing a governmental duty to maximize student’s
potential. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom guarantees
Canadian citizens’ right to education.105 Because English and French are
both official languages of Canada, the Charter constitutionally guarantees

101. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
102. Id. at 1001 (citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Compare Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (holding that disabled students’ potential need not
be maximized), and Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (holding that an educational program should
be reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances).
105. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S 16 & 23, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (Can.).
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access to education in either language.106 The Charter ensures that the
government provides education to Canadian children in their parents’
primary language, even in areas where only a minority of residents speak
that language.107 As a result, Canadian students have the constitutional right
to attend classes taught in either first language French classes in provinces
where French is not the majority language, or taught in English where
English is not the majority language. Education is a civil right because
Canada recognizes that education is “necessary for the preservation and
promotion” of communities and dignity of all students.108
The Charter also guarantees equal rights stating every individual is “. . .
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and
benefit of the law . . . .”109 Unlike the United States, Canada has a
substantive approach to equality—a focus on the effect or impact rather than
treatment or discriminatory intent. This approach to equality, along with the
right to education, allows better development of diverse human potential that
the United States would benefit from.
A. Equal Rights in Canada

In Eldridge v. British Columbia,110 the Supreme Court of Canada
provides the basis for equality rights for diverse cognitive groups.
Appellants Robin Eldridge and Linda Warren were born deaf and wished to
have the use of sign language interpreters with their doctors in hospitals
covered by their health insurance.111 A private company supplied
interpreters in the past, but this service was discontinued due to a lack of
funding.112 Appellants claimed that the communication barrier between
them and their doctors resulted in lesser quality of care, which infringed on
their right to equal benefit of the law under the Charter.113 The Court
unanimously held that the Charter protected equality rights to protect human
dignity and rectify discrimination against disadvantaged groups.114 The
Court held that British Columbia was obliged to provide translators to the
deaf to provide equal access to core benefits accorded to everyone under the
British Columbia healthcare scheme.115 Failing to provide ASL translators

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 105.
Id.
Constitution Act 1982 S 15.1 (Can.).
Id.
[1997] 3 SCR 624.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 690.
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for the deaf effectively denied to one group of disabled people the benefit
granted by law to other people.116
In Auton v. British Columbia,117 the Court distinguished its holding in
Eldridge when it held that access to a benefit that the law has not conferred
to any group of people is not subject to the equality provision in the Charter.
In Auton, four infant, autistic petitioners sued the government for not funding
a behavioral therapy for all autistic children between the ages of three and
six years old.118 The claimants needed to show unequal treatment under the
law, specifically that they did not receive a benefit that the law provided to
someone else.119 The promise of equality, therefore, had to be confined to
benefits and burdens “of the law.”120 Petitioners argued that the unequal
treatment stemmed from funding medically required treatments for children
or adults with mental illness, while refusing to fund medically required
therapy to autistic children. The Court found, however, that the legislative
scheme only provided that medically necessary treatment, or core services,
are funded if they are “medically required.”121 In the end, the therapy in
question was found only to be emergent in nature, not “medically necessary,”
and, therefore, there was no discrimination.122 Still, the Court emphasized
using a substantive and contextual approach to equality rather than a narrow,
formalistic approach.123
More importantly, the Court emphasized that equality is understood as a
comparative concept requiring a claimant to point to some person who has
been better treated in order to ground a claim.124 The Court rejected
plaintiff’s attempts to compare autistic children to children suffering other
disabilities. Instead, the Court held that the appropriate comparator group
was a non-disabled person who sought or received funding for a non-core
therapy that was becoming recognized as medically required.125 This
approach to neurodiversity is significant because the comparator groups look
past distinctions separating people deemed to be typical or atypical. This
substantive approach to equality is what sets education equality in Canada
apart from the categorically, separate education in the United States.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Eldridge, 3 SCR at 690.
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (AG), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Auton, 3 S.C.R. at 670.
Lollini, supra note 3, at 19.
Id.
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B. Equal Education in Canada
In Moore v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
students with disabilities are entitled to necessary educational
accommodations in order to access and benefit from public education.126 In
this case, Jeffrey Moore had a learning disability that required intensive
remediation to read.127 The North Vancouver School District provided
Moore with a range of support services, but a funding shortage in the
Province resulted in eliminating the program crucial to Moore’s education.128
School officials advised Moore to attend private school for the remediation
he required, but his parents had to pay for the remediation.129 Moore’s father
filed a complaint on his behalf alleging that the school district and Province
discriminated against him because of his disability and denied him a service
customarily available to the public.130 The Human Rights Tribunal found
the Province and school district’s actions unconstitutional.131 The Court of
Appeal for British Columbia, however, overturned the Tribunal decision and
held that there was no discrimination against Moore because he was not
treated differently than other students with disabilities.132 Finally, the
Supreme Court of Canada found it offensive that the Court of Appeals
compared Moore only to students with disabilities and agreed with the
Tribunal’s decision.133
The Court held that the service Moore was entitled to under the British
Columbia Human Rights Code was education generally, not special
education specifically.134
The Canadian government, therefore,
acknowledged that the reason children are entitled to an education is because
a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution:
This is because defining special education as the service at
issue risks descending into a kind of ‘separate but equal
approach’ . . . comparing [Moore] only with other special needs
students would mean that the District could cut all special needs
programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination . . .
if compared only to other special needs students, full
consideration cannot be given to whether he had meaningful

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Moore v. British Columbia, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (Can.).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Moore, 3. S.C.R. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id.
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access to education to which all students in British Columbia are
entitled.135
Moore holds that adequate special education is not a dispensable luxury
because it provides access for children with disabilities to the statutory
commitment to education made to all children.136 This holding that students
with disabilities have an equal right to education as students without
disabilities starkly contrasts to America’s approach to equal education.

Conclusion
Approaching equality with a focus on effect or impact, as in Canada,
instead of treatment or discriminatory effect, as in the United States, compels
a democracy to maximize the potential of every student rather than a typical
few. This approach better supports neurodiversity because a society has a
duty to make education quality and access substantively equal rather than
formally equal. A democracy can better establish this approach to
educational equality by considering education as a fundamental right and
inherently rejecting a separate but equal analysis.
Public education in the United States falls short of public education in
Canada because America does not recognize education as a constitutional
right and fails to find a duty to maximize every students’ potential. Canada,
on the other hand, provides the same type of educational standards for every
student, not only because it is just, but because it is a function of democracy.
Canada, therefore, approaches equal education to be maximizing every
students’ potential. This approach makes use of neurodiversity because it
maximizes the ability of all learners, whether they are atypical or not.
The government has the means to provide people with foundational tools
to compete and contribute to society with equal advantage through public
education.137
When American public schools institutionally isolate
vulnerable students who have atypical cognitive performance or learning
styles, it harms its own democracy.138 High rates of children of color
enrolled in special education with either undiagnosed or untreated language
and learning disabilities reflect the discriminatory and ignorant reality of the
American public school system.139 Additionally, many disabled youth in the

135. Id.
136. Moore, 3. S.C.R. at 362.
137. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 48.
138. Hensel, supra note 16, at 1147–48.
139. Shameka Stanford & Bahiyyah Muhammad, The Confluence of Language and Learning
Disorders and the School-To-Prison Pipeline Among Minority Students of Color: A Critical Race
Theory, 26 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 691, 698 (2018).
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American juvenile justice and criminal justice systems are deprived of an
appropriate education that could disrupt the school-to-prison pipeline.140
Because Congress only intended to make public education available to
disabled children who were previously excluded from the system, the
government does not find a duty to maximize disabled students’ potential.
Education is not a fundamental right, therefore, providing equal education
for disabled students is not an integral service available. Instead, providing
disabled students with unequal education suffices because they will make
appropriate progress. As a result, disabled students in American public
schools do not have a right to maximize their human potential and
contribute to society.
America appears to treat education as a service rather than a right. This
contributes to the vague governmental duty to educate individual students
differently based on categorizing students as disabled or not, making a
typical versus atypical distinction. This duty promotes separate, unequal,
and different educational opportunities for students with disabilities.141
Canada, on the other hand, renounces the “separate but equal” inquiry for
disabled students because all students have an equal right to education.142
This is because Canada finds a governmental duty to meaningfully maximize
every student’s potential regardless of disability.143 These two approaches
reflect contrasting governmental commitments to incorporate neurodiversity
into the democracy; an incorporation that benefits both individuals and
societies at large.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Cortiella & Horowitz, supra note 8.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
Moore, 3 S.C.R. at 360.
Id.

